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Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: 




In National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to post 
certain signs.1 The Court implied that the case involved a 
relatively straightforward example of governmental 
overreaching, with the government allegedly attempting to 
commandeer private entities and force them to convey the 
government’s message.2 Yet, the Court omitted important 
background information when discussing the state’s 
implicated interests,3 and the Court’s analyses and 
rationales may have important First Amendment 
implications. While the Court may have reached the right 
result, its analyses bode poorly for a reasoned and 
consistent approach with respect to abortion regulations on 
 
† Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus Ohio. 
 1. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018). 
 2. See id. at 2371 (“[L]icensed clinics must provide a government-drafted 
script about the availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact 
information for how to obtain them.”). 
 3. See infra notes 4–25 and accompanying text. 
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the one hand or a variety of First Amendment issues on the 
other. 
Part II of this Article offers background information 
about crisis pregnancy centers as well as some discussion of 
the existing jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of 
limitations on commercial and professional speech. Part III 
discusses Becerra, noting how the decision omitted 
important information that should have been part of the 
analysis—while the result would have been the same, the 
Court would not have been implying that it was making 
important changes in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part 
IV discusses some of the possible implications of Becerra, 
including some of the suits that likely will be filed in light 
of the opinion. The Article concludes that the opinion has a 
number of surprising implications and time will tell 
whether these reflect poor craftsmanship or instead a shift 
in a few different areas of constitutional law. 
II. CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER REGULATION 
Crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) provide a variety of 
free services to pregnant women, although critics charge 
that many of the centers use misleading advertisements to 
induce women to come to the centers and that many of the 
centers provide misinformation about abortion to some of 
their clients. States attempting to regulate what is said in 
these ads or centers have faced a variety of challenges 
focusing on whether the states are thereby violating First 
Amendment speech guarantees. Any analysis of those 
guarantees must include an analysis of the kind of speech 
being regulated and the kind of tests that are thereby 
triggered, which themselves have been quite controversial. 
This Section offers some background information about 
CPCs and about the constitutional limitations on 
regulations of commercial and professional speech. 
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A. Background on Crisis Pregnancy Centers 
CPCs have a nationwide presence.4 They provide a 
variety of services to pregnant women,5 often free of 
charge.6 These centers do not provide abortions,7 and may 
seek to dissuade women from aborting their pregnancies.8 
Critics charge that some9 of the centers use deceptive 
means to reduce the number of abortions performed,10 for 
example, by misrepresenting in advertisements what the 
 
 4. Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How 
to Stop These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 
37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 77 (2017) (“Since their inception in the 1960s, 
crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) have proliferated throughout the United States 
and now exist in every state.”). 
 5. Victoria Fuller, When Care and Conscience Conflict: Compelled Speech in 
the Amendment to the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act, 42 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 297, 300 (2018) (“Crisis pregnancy centers provide numerous social 
services, such as parenting classes, options counseling, baby supplies, and other 
financial aid.”); Kirsten Gallacher, Protecting Women from Deception: The 
Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements in Pregnancy Centers, 33 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 113, 114–15 (2011) (“[P]regnancy centers often provide valuable 
services like practical assistance and emotional support.”). 
 6. Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met Their Match: 
California’s Reproductive FACT Act, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 79–80 (2017) 
(“Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs), also known as Limited Service Pregnancy 
Centers or Pregnancy Resource Centers, are pro-life, non-profit organizations 
that provide counseling and limited pregnancy services to women, usually free 
of charge.”). 
 7. Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion 
Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 116 (2015) (“CPCs are pregnancy service 
providers that do not provide abortion despite the misleading nomenclature of 
‘crisis pregnancy center.’”). 
 8. Id. at 115 (“Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) . . . misleadingly suggest 
that abortions are provided in order to draw women in and then dissuade them 
from getting an abortion.”). 
 9. Cf. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[S]ome CPCs ‘openly acknowledge, in their advertising and their facilities, 
that they do not provide abortions or emergency contraception.’” (citation 
omitted)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018). 
 10. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled 
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 597 
(2012) (“A host of . . . reports have provided further documentation of continued 
deception by crisis pregnancy centers.”). 
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centers do so that women seeking abortions will 
nonetheless come to the clinics.11 Once there, the women 
may be provided with false or misleading information,12 
including misinformation about the alleged detrimental 
effects of abortion.13 
Other methods to deter abortion include 
misrepresenting how far along a pregnancy is, which might 
result in a pregnant woman’s missing the deadline for 
obtaining an abortion.14 In addition, a woman might be 
advised to wait to obtain an abortion until after the fetus is 
viable,15 justified perhaps by claiming that there is a 
significant probability that the woman will have a 
miscarriage and so will not have to undergo any 
procedure.16 But putting off an abortion can have adverse 
 
 11. Id. at 597–98 (“[T]he centers disguise the true nature of the services 
they will provide in order to lure women to the clinic.”). 
 12. Id. at 598 (“[O]nce women are at the clinic, the centers provide them 
with false and misleading information.”). 
 13. Id. at 597 (discussing a report finding that “87% of the centers 
investigated ‘provided false or misleading information about the health effects 
of abortion,’ and that the centers often ‘grossly misrepresented the medical 
risks of abortion.’”(citation omitted)). See also Holtzman, supra note 6, at 80 (“If 
CPCs do discuss abortion as an option with their clients, those women are 
inundated with unreliable and egregiously misleading information about 
abortion procedures and the risks involved.”). 
 14. Holtzman, supra note 6, at 85 (“CPCs also attempt to delay a woman’s 
ability to obtain a safe legal abortion . . . by lying about gestational 
age. . . . Other CPCs simply deceive women by telling them they are not far 
along in their pregnancy, hoping that the women will miss the window of 
opportunity for obtaining an abortion.”). See also Evergreen Ass’n v. City of 
N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 239–41 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing a case in which a woman 
was inaccurately told that she needed multiple ultrasounds before she could 
obtain an abortion, eventually resulting in her missing the deadline to obtain 
an abortion). 
 15. Holtzman, supra note 6, at 85 (“[T]he website for Los Angeles Pregnancy 
Services, a CPC, instructs women not to seek an abortion until they have 
‘confirmed from an ultrasound that the pregnancy is viable.’”(citation omitted)). 
 16. Id. (“CPCs also attempt to delay a woman’s ability to obtain a safe legal 
abortion by . . . exaggerating the number of pregnancies that end in natural 
miscarriages . . . . For instance, during the NARAL investigations, one CPC told 
women that induced abortion was not necessary because 30% to 50% of all 
pregnancies end in a miscarriage or a ‘spontaneous abortion.’”). 
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health effects,17 even assuming that such an option is still 
available when the procedure is sought. 
Women who mistakenly go to a CPC may believe that 
they are in a medical clinic where various medical services 
can be obtained.18 The impression that the center is a full-
service clinic is bolstered when people working there wear 
white lab coats or medical scrubs, thereby creating an 
impression that those individuals perform certain services, 
even if those individuals are not licensed to provide those 
services.19 If women seeking an abortion who went into the 
CPCs learned right away that such services could not be 
provided, they at least would not waste valuable time 
waiting for something that could not be provided, although 
a separate question would involve how soon thereafter an 
appointment to obtain an abortion could be made and 
whether, in addition, a mandated waiting period would 
further delay when such a procedure could take place.20 
Women who mistakenly go to the CPCs may not have 
 
 17. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2390 
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The legislature heard that information-related 
delays in qualified healthcare negatively affect women seeking to terminate 
their pregnancies.”); Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 239–40 (“Dr. Susan Blank, an 
Assistant Commissioner at the New York City Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, . . . noted the dangers of delays in access to abortion services 
and emergency contraception.”); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. 
v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]the risks and costs of 
abortion increase as a woman advances through her pregnancy.”). 
 18. See Holtzman, supra note 6, at 88 (discussing the “preliminary threshold 
deception that women who accidently visit CPCs believe they are medical 
clinics”). 
 19. Id. at 83 (“Most CPCs are unlicensed facilities and are staffed by 
volunteers who are not licensed medical professionals. . . . [M]any CPCs 
require . . . center volunteers and staff to wear white lab coats or medical 
scrubs. These unlicensed establishments cannot legally provide medical services 
and instead focus primarily on counseling, having women take pregnancy tests, 
and in some cases conducting ultrasounds.”). 
 20. Catherine Gamper, A Chill Wind Blows: Undue Burden in the Wake of 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 76 MD. L. REV. 792, 805 (2017) (“Several 
federal appellate courts have found laws that require . . . twenty-four- to forty-
eight-hour waiting periods . . . do not impose an undue burden on women 
seeking abortions.”). 
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ended up there through mere happenstance. In Evergreen 
Ass’n v. City of New York, the Second Circuit noted 
testimony that CPCs are sometimes intentionally located 
near Planned Parenthood offices and have confusing 
signage.21 Or, a CPC bus might be parked in front of a clinic 
providing abortions—the CPC workers might claim that 
they work at the clinic or, perhaps, that the clinic is closed 
but that some services can be provided in the bus.22 
Needless to say, the services provided by the CPC would not 
include abortion.23 
Women might mistakenly go to CPCs for an additional 
reason—a CPC might advertise that it provides abortions.24 
Or, a CPC might arrange for its name to pop up in a 
prominent place for those doing an internet search using 
“abortion” as a search term.25 Precisely because women who 
seek abortions may have been misled into going to CPCs, 
states seeking to regulate CPC speech may be doing so in 
response to what are perceived to be deceptive practices26 
 
 21. 740 F.3d at 250 (“Joan Malin, President and CEO of Planned 
Parenthood, testified that CPCs are often intentionally located in proximity to 
Planned Parenthood facilities and that they often use misleading names and 
signage.”). 
 22. Id. (“Mariana Banzil, the Executive Director at Dr. Emily Women’s 
Health Center, testified about a particular CPC that would park a bus in front 
of her clinic, from which the CPC’s counselors, often wearing scrubs, would offer 
ultrasounds, harass Center patients, tell patients that the Center was closed, or 
identify themselves as Center workers.”). 
 23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Daniel J. Faria, Advertising for Life: CPC Posting Laws and the Case 
of Baltimore City Ordinance 09-252, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 379, 386 
(2012) (discussing an allegation that such a clinic had “held itself out as an 
abortion provider in print advertisements”). 
 25. Holtzman, supra note 6, at 86 (“‘Pay-per-click’ advertising allows CPCs 
to place bids on keywords, such as ‘abortion’ . . . . When users search those 
keywords on search engines, the advertisement for the highest bidding 
organization will appear at the top of the page as the first result. . . . Similarly, 
CPCs are often listed under ‘abortion services’ in phone books.”). 
 26. Id. at 90 (“[T]the City could have used or amended existing regulations 
regarding fraudulent advertising to combat CPCs’ deceptive advertising 
campaigns.”). See also O’Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815 (D. 
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rather than because they want to target a disfavored 
message.27 Nonetheless, even if a state is not trying to 
target a disfavored message by forcing the clinics to post 
certain information, the chosen means must be sufficiently 
closely tailored to promote sufficiently important interests 
if the state’s chosen method to combat the deceptive 
practices is to survive judicial scrutiny.28 For example, the 
Second Circuit rejected that a New York City requirement 
imposed on pregnancy service centers was sufficiently 
closely tailored to pass constitutional muster.29 
B. Regulation of Commercial Speech 
When discussing whether even deceptive speech can be 
regulated without offending constitutional guarantees, it is 
important to characterize the speech. Some kinds of speech 
fall outside of First Amendment protections,30 whereas 
 
Md. 2011) (“Defendants contend that even though the Ordinance applies only to 
limited-service pregnancy centers who are opposed to abortions and certain 
methods of birth-control, its purpose is to mitigate the effect of deceptive 
advertising, not to express disagreement with a particular viewpoint.”), aff’d 
sub nom. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 
F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, No. 11-1111(L), 2012 WL 
7855859 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 721 F.3d 
264 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 27. See O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (“Defendants enacted the Ordinance 
out of disagreement with Plaintiffs’ viewpoints on abortion and birth-control.”). 
 28. See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (discussing the State’s 
means-end fit with respect to certain CPC regulations). 
 29. See Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 30. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (naming the 
exceptions including “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless 
action,” “obscenity,” “defamation,” “speech integral to criminal conduct,” 
“fighting words,” “child pornography,” “fraud,” “true threats,” and “speech 
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to 
prevent”). The Alvarez Court noted that false statements per se are not 
unprotected. See id. at 718 (“Absent from those few categories where the law 
allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First 
Amendment for false statements.”). However, it is also true that false 
statements are not protected for their inherent worth. Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) 
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its 
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other kinds of speech like political speech are paradigmatic 
of what the First Amendment protects.31 Commercial 
speech is protected, although not to the same degree as is 
political speech.32 
The Court has offered a “four-part analysis” for use in 
“commercial speech cases.”33 In order for commercial speech 
to qualify for protection under the First Amendment, “it at 
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.”34 
Assuming that First Amendment protection has been 
triggered, “the asserted governmental interest [must be] 
substantial,”35 and “the regulation [must] directly advance[] 
the governmental interest asserted, and . . . not [be] more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”36 
However, the Court has explained, the “not more extensive 
than necessary” requirement is much looser than the literal 
language might suggest.37 
Regulations of commercial speech trigger intermediate 
scrutiny.38 However, there is some question whether the 
 
own sake.”). 
 31. Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1037, 1045 (2010) (“Political speech is the paradigmatic example of the content 
that the First Amendment strives to protect.”). 
 32. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; 
commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a 
sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least 
protection of all.”). 
 33. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 
(suggesting that there must be a good fit but rejecting a requirement “that the 
manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired 
end”). 
 38. Caren Schmulen Sweetland, The Demise of a Workable Commercial 
Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to 
Commercial Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEX. L. REV. 471, 492 (1997) (“[T]he 
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advertising used by CPCs should be treated as commercial 
speech. After all, the services performed are free of 
charge,39 so there is a sense in which what is provided 
should not be thought a commercial transaction but, 
instead, a gift.40 
The Court has not provided a clear definition of 
commercial speech, although the Court has explained that 
“the core notion of commercial speech [is] ‘speech which 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”41 
But if the Court’s language about “doing no more than 
proposing a commercial transaction” is taken literally, then 
entities wishing to assure that their advertisements receive 
strong First Amendment protection could simply include 
some non-commercial information in their advertising. The 
Court’s language about doing no more than proposing a 
transaction should not be taken literally—the mere 
inclusion of a little non-commercial information will not 
transform what would have been commercial speech into 
non-commercial speech enjoying full-blown First 
Amendment protection. One’s “[i]ncluding home economics 
elements [in kitchen appliance demonstrations would] no 
more convert[] . . . presentations into educational speech 
than [would] opening sales presentations with a prayer or a 
 
commercial speech doctrine dictates that government regulations of commercial 
speech be subjected to a less strict review than those of political speech, 
requiring what has been termed an ‘intermediate review’ of the justifications 
behind commercial regulations.”). 
 39. Meagan Burrows, The Cubbyhole Conundrum: First Amendment 
Doctrine in the Face of Deceptive Crisis Pregnancy Center Speech, 45 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 896, 916 (2014) (“The CPCs, on the other hand, argue that 
because they are non-profits with no economic motive for service provision, and 
because they do not employ medical professionals traditionally subject to 
licensing and regulation by the State, their speech is neither commercial nor 
professional in nature.”). 
 40. Cf. United States v. Goldberg, No. 87-3162, 1988 WL 63747, at *3 (9th 
Cir. June 13, 1988) (suggesting that the “transaction was commercial and not 
an exchange of gifts”). 
 41. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976)). 
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Pledge of Allegiance . . . convert them into religious or 
political speech.”42 
The Court has made clear that “advertising which ‘links 
a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled 
to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial 
speech.”43 However, speech designed to secure an economic 
advantage is not necessarily treated as merely 
commercial—the Court has rejected that “speech retains its 
commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined 
with otherwise fully protected speech.”44 For example, 
charitable “solicitation is characteristically intertwined 
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking 
support for particular causes or for particular views on 
economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that 
without solicitation the flow of such information and 
advocacy would likely cease.”45 Thus, speech seeking 
donations so that individuals can continue to educate the 
public about important political, social, or economic matters 
might receive robust protection, notwithstanding that the 
speech is designed to raise money. 
The presence of an economic motivation need not 
convert fully protected speech into mere commercial speech 
and the inclusion of noncommercial (fully protected) speech 
need not transform advertising into fully protected speech—
together, these points “illustrate[] the difficulty of drawing 
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a 
distinct category.”46 However, merely because there are no 
clear bright lines does not establish that no guidance can be 
given, and it simply is not an option to throw up one’s 
 
 42. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474–75. 
 43. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)). 
 44. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
 45. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 
(1980). 
 46. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993). 
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hands and say that one cannot tell whether speech is 
commercial or noncommercial. Precisely “[b]ecause the 
degree of protection afforded by the First Amendment 
depends on whether the activity sought to be regulated 
constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech,”47 the 
Court must afford guidance as to which speech counts as 
commercial and which does not. 
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corporation, the 
Court discussed whether certain pamphlets discussing 
contraceptives and, in addition, venereal disease and family 
planning, should be classified as commercial speech, 
offering the following analysis: 
The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be 
advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they 
are commercial speech. Similarly, the reference to a specific 
product does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial 
speech. Finally, the fact that . . . [there is] an economic motivation 
for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to 
turn the materials into commercial speech. . . . The combination of 
all these characteristics, however, provides strong support for 
the . . . conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly 
characterized as commercial speech.48 
Before applying the Bolger factors in the CPC context, 
one matter can be disposed of relatively quickly. The fact 
that CPCs provide services rather than products does not 
preclude a finding that they engage in commercial speech—
commercial speech need not involve products rather than 
services.49 However, CPC activities might seem not to 
trigger the lower level of scrutiny associated with 
commercial speech for a different reason, namely, their 
provision of free services might be thought to preclude the 
speech from being categorized as commercial.50 Yet, there 
 
 47. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65. 
 48. Id. at 66–67 (citations omitted). 
 49. See Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975) (stating advertisement of 
abortion services constituted commercial speech and hence had some First 
Amendment protection). 
 50. See Kathryn E. Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy 
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are a few reasons that a CPC’s refusal to charge for a 
service might not entitle its speech to the highest level of 
protection. 
CPCs advertise, which meets the first of the Bolger 
factors.51 Further, CPCs advertise that they provide 
particular services,52 which meets the second factor. The 
more difficult question is whether the CPCs have an 
economic motivation when providing these free services. 
But two points might be made with respect to that third 
factor. First, the Court has not suggested that each of the 
factors must be met in order to something to qualify as 
commercial speech,53 which was one of the reasons that the 
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected that the provision of 
free services was dispositive with respect to whether clinic 
speech might nonetheless qualify as commercial speech and 
trigger a lower level of scrutiny.54 Second, CPCs receive 
 
Center Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
591, 602 (2013) (“[O]ne of the primary problems with the commercial 
transaction definition is that, in practice, it prevents a court from classifying an 
offer of free goods or services as ‘commercial speech,’ even though such a finding 
might be warranted in some cases.”). 
 51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 52. Campbell, supra note 4, at 87 (“CPC advertisements portray the centers 
as comprehensive health clinics that offer reproductive health services like 
contraception and abortion.”); Faria, supra note 24, at 384–85 (“CPCs often list 
themselves in phonebooks under such headings as ‘abortion’ and ‘abortion 
services,’ advertise themselves under online headings referring to abortion and 
contraception, or direct staff members to refrain from letting callers know that 
they will not receive access to contraception or referrals to abortion providers.”). 
 53. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 n.14 (“Nor do we mean to suggest that each of the 
characteristics present in this case must necessarily be present in order for 
speech to be commercial.”). 
 54. Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 180–81 (N.D. 
1986) (“Irrespective of the degree, if any, that monies are received by the Help 
Clinic from its clients we do not believe that factor is dispositive of our 
determination that the communication involved is commercial speech.”). See 
also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 
264, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he potential commercial nature of speech does 
not hinge solely on whether the Center has an economic motive, as even Bolger 
does not preclude classification of speech as commercial in the absence of the 
speaker’s economic motivation.”). 
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funding from other sources to do their work.55 If that 
funding is tied to the number of clients served either 
directly (e.g., receiving a certain amount for each client 
served) or indirectly (those serving many clients are likely 
to receive more money than those serving relatively few 
clients), then CPCs have an economic incentive to increase 
the number of patients they serve through their 
advertising,56 which suggests that all three factors taken 
together provide strong support for the conclusion that CPC 
advertising qualifies as commercial advertising.57 If that is 
so, then regulations of CPC advertising would be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, assuming that it is not deceptive or 
misleading.58 
 
 55. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Tata, 742 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Berger v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
N.C., 135 S. Ct. 2886 (2015) (“A ‘Choose Life’ plate, like many other specialty 
license plates, costs a vehicle owner an additional $25 per year. Of the $25, $15 
go to the Carolina Pregnancy Care Fellowship, a private organization that 
supports crisis pregnancy centers in North Carolina.” (citations omitted)); 
Gallacher, supra note 5, at 122–23 (“Both state and federal governments fund 
pregnancy centers. . . . Between 2001 and 2005, in an effort to promote 
abstinence, the George W. Bush Administration drastically increased 
government funding for pregnancy centers by allocating over $30 million in 
federal funds to more than fifty pregnancy centers. In addition, states such as 
Pennsylvania and Texas provide state funding to pregnancy centers through 
programs like Alternatives to Abortion. Thirteen states also permit Choose Life 
license plates and donate a portion of the funds raised from the sale of these 
plates to pregnancy centers.”). 
 56. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Here, 
the solicitation of a non-paying client base directly relates to an LSPC’s ability 
to fundraise. . . . Furthermore, . . . successful advertising directly affects 
employee compensation. . . . Because LSPCs utilize advertising to maintain a 
patient base, which in turn can generate income, we conclude that LSPCs have 
an economic motivation for advertising their services.”). 
 57. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) 
(“The States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination 
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.”) (citing Friedman 
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)). 
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C. Regulation of Professional Speech 
An issue related to but distinct from the constitutional 
limitations on the regulation of commercial speech involves 
the constitutional limitations on the regulation of 
professional speech.59 The Court has discussed the 
regulation of professional speech in several cases, offering 
some guidelines with respect to the kinds of limitations that 
can be imposed without violating constitutional 
guarantees.60 
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment involved “a municipal ordinance prohibiting 
the solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations 
that do not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for 
‘charitable purposes.’”61 The ordinance was challenged by 
Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), who wanted the 
right to seek donations in the town.62 The Village denied 
CBE the right to solicit, because over 60% of the funds 
collected were used for the benefit of CBE employees.63 The 
Village argued that an organization using such a high 
percentage of the raised funds for itself rather than for 
charitable purposes is better characterized as an 
organization raising money for its own private benefit than 
as a charity.64 
 
 59. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by 
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“In 
explaining why this level of protection is appropriate, we find it helpful to 
compare professional speech to commercial speech.”). 
 60. See infra notes 61–128 and accompanying text. 
 61. 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980). 
 62. Id. at 625 (“CBE requested permission to solicit contributions in the 
Village.”). 
 63. Id. at 626 (“The Village also alleged ‘that more than 60% of the funds 
collected [by CBE] have been spent for benefits of employees and not for any 
charitable purposes.’”). 
 64. Id. at 633 (“The Village claims, however, that . . . because CBE spends so 
much of its resources for the benefit of its employees that it may appropriately 
be deemed an organization existing for private profit rather than for charitable 
purposes.”). 
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In effect, CBE was soliciting donations so that its 
employees could continue to inform the public about 
environmental concerns. The Court noted that “solicitation 
is characteristically intertwined with informative and 
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular 
causes or for particular views on economic, political, or 
social issues,”65 and recognized “the reality that without 
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy 
would likely cease.”66 Precisely because upholding the 
regulation would in effect make it impossible for the 
organization to engage in protected First Amendment 
activities, the Court struck down the regulation.67 
Five years after deciding Schaumberg, the Court 
decided a case involving the regulation of attorney 
advertising. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
the Court examined whether the State of Ohio could 
“discipline an attorney for soliciting business by running 
newspaper advertisements containing nondeceptive 
illustrations and legal advice.”68 
Zauderer had placed an ad in a newspaper offering to 
represent defendants in drunk driving cases.69 The ad 
suggested that client legal fees would be refunded if the 
 
 65. Id. at 632, 635 (discussing “organizations whose primary purpose is not 
to provide money or services for the poor, the needy or other worthy objects of 
charity, but to gather and disseminate information about and advocate 
positions on matters of public concern”); see also Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 949–50 (1984) (striking down a Maryland statute 
imposing a cap on the expenses associated with charitable fundraising). The 
Maryland statute was distinguishable from the Schaumberg ordinance. See id. 
at 975 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the “Maryland statute, whose 
primary and legitimate effect is to prohibit professional fundraisers from 
charging charities a fee of more than 25% of the amount raised”). 
 66. Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 632. 
 67. Id. at 636 (“[T]he Village’s proffered justifications are inadequate 
and . . . the ordinance cannot survive scrutiny under the First Amendment.”). 
 68. 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985). 
 69. Id. (“[H]e ran a small advertisement in the Columbus Citizen Journal 
advising its readers that his law firm would represent defendants in drunken 
driving cases.”). 
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client was convicted of drunk driving.70 The attorney was 
informed that the “advertisement appeared to be an offer to 
represent criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis,”71 
which was “a practice prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 2-
106(C) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.”72 
Zauderer withdrew the ad and refused to take on any 
clients responding to that ad.73 
Zauderer subsequently placed an ad in over 30 
newspapers discussing “his willingness to represent women 
who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of a 
contraceptive device known as the Dalkon Shield 
Intrauterine Device.”74 This ad was claimed to be deceptive 
because “any advertisement that mentions contingent-fee 
rates must ‘disclos[e] whether percentages are computed 
before or after deduction of court costs and expenses.’”75 In 
addition, “the ad’s failure to inform clients that they would 
be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if their 
claims were unsuccessful rendered the advertisement 
‘deceptive.’”76 
The Zauderer Court explained that “‘commercial speech’ 
is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit 
to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded 
‘noncommercial speech.’”77 That said, “[t]he States and the 
Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination 
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or 
 
 70. Id. at 629–30. 
 71. Id. at 630. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (“Appellant immediately withdrew the advertisement and in a letter 
to Kettlewell apologized for running it, also stating in the letter that he would 
decline to accept employment by persons responding to the ad.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 633. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 637 (citing Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)). 
2019] DECEPTION, SPEECH & CPCs 327 
misleading,”78 However, “[c]ommercial speech that is not 
false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful 
activities . . . may be restricted only in the service of a 
substantial governmental interest, and only through means 
that directly advance that interest.”79 While rejecting that 
“appellant’s statements regarding the Dalkon Shield 
were . . . false or deceptive,”80 the Court was more 
sympathetic to the state’s claim that consumers might be 
confused by the failure to specify “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information about the terms under which 
his services will be available.”81 Further, the “appellant’s 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any 
particular factual information in his advertising is 
minimal,”82 and because “disclosure requirements trench 
much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do 
flat prohibitions on speech, ‘warning[s] or disclaimer[s] 
might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate 
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.’”83 
Zauderer is important for several reasons. It reaffirms 
that states have great leeway when seeking to regulate 
deceptive advertising, and imposes intermediate (rather 
than strict) scrutiny when examining non-deceptive 
commercial speech. Further, it minimizes the burden 
imposed by a state requirement that Zauderer provide 
factual information that might clear up misconceptions, 
even though the provision of that information might thwart 
his purposes by reducing the number of individuals seeking 
legal services. 
While Zauderer’s claims were not inherently 
 
 78. Id. at 638 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)). 
 79. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 80. Id. at 641. 
 81. Id. at 651. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). 
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misleading,84 he was still appropriately disciplined for 
failing to disclose that clients unsuccessfully bringing a tort 
claim might still be responsible for “costs” rather than 
“legal fees.”85 The Court did not cite to any actual instances 
of confusion, instead merely noting that “to a layman not 
aware of the meaning of these terms of art, the 
advertisement would suggest that employing appellant 
would be a no-lose proposition in that his representation in 
a losing cause would come entirely free of charge.”86 To 
refute the charge that such a worry was merely 
“speculative,”87 the Court explained that “it is a 
commonplace that members of the public are often unaware 
of the technical meanings of such terms as ‘fees’ and 
‘costs’—terms that, in ordinary usage, might well be 
virtually interchangeable.”88 Where it is obvious that 
“substantial numbers of potential clients would 
be . . . misled,”89 and “[w]hen the possibility of deception is 
as self-evident as it is in this case, [the Court does] . . . not 
require the State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public 
before it [may] determine that the [advertisement] had a 
tendency to mislead.’”90 While speech in the commercial 
context still triggers First Amendment guarantees,91 “rights 
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
 
 84. Id. at 641 (“The State’s power to prohibit advertising that is ‘inherently 
misleading,’ thus cannot justify Ohio’s decision to discipline appellant for 
running advertising geared to persons with a specific legal problem.” (citing 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203)). 
 85. Id. at 652. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 652–53 (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–
92 (1965)). 
 91. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
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deception of consumers.”92 Zauderer thus seems to 
represent a relatively deferential approach to state 
regulations of commercial speech, where the State “has only 
required [individuals] to provide somewhat more 
information than they might otherwise be inclined to 
present”93 as a means of “dissipat[ing] the possibility of 
consumer confusion or deception.’”94 
In Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., the 
Court addressed a disclosure law imposed on professional 
fundraisers that was designed to take into account some of 
the concerns addressed in Schaumberg.95 The North 
Carolina law specified: 
A fee up to 20% of the gross receipts collected is deemed 
reasonable. If the fee retained is between 20% and 35%, the Act 
deems it unreasonable upon a showing that the solicitation at 
issue did not involve the “dissemination of information, discussion, 
or advocacy relating to public issues as directed by the [charitable 
organization] which is to benefit from the solicitation.” Finally, a 
fee exceeding 35% is presumed unreasonable, but the fundraiser 
may rebut the presumption by showing that the amount of the fee 
was necessary either (1) because the solicitation involved the 
dissemination of information or advocacy on public issues directed 
by the charity, or (2) because otherwise the charity’s ability to 
raise money or communicate would be significantly diminished.96 
The North Carolina law seemed to take into account 
some of the points previously made by the Court, 
recognizing that greater flexibility might be required where 
the solicitation involved the “dissemination of information, 
discussion, or advocacy relating to public issues”97 or 
“because otherwise the charity’s ability to raise money or 
 
 92. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 93. Id. at 650. 
 94. Id. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). 
 95. 487 U.S. 781, 784, 787, 795–96 (1988). See also supra notes 61–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. Id. at 784–86 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C (1986)). 
 97. Id. at 785. 
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communicate would be significantly diminished.”98 But the 
Court rejected “the State’s argument . . . that its three-
tiered, percentage-based definition of ‘unreasonable’ passes 
constitutional muster,”99 reasoning that “the solicitation of 
charitable contributions is protected speech, and that using 
percentages to decide the legality of the fundraiser’s fee is 
not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in preventing 
fraud.”100 Part of the justification for striking down the law 
was that the State had other tools at its disposal: “North 
Carolina has an antifraud law, and . . . law enforcement 
officers are ready and able to enforce it.”101 In addition, 
“North Carolina may constitutionally require fundraisers to 
disclose certain financial information to the State.”102 
The Court contrasted the requirement that fundraisers 
make certain disclosures to the State with the requirement 
that fundraisers, themselves, make certain disclosures to 
prospective donors. When evaluating “the requirement that 
professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors, before 
an appeal for funds, the percentage of charitable 
contributions collected during the previous 12 months that 
were actually turned over to charity,”103 the Court noted 
that “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not 
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the 
speech.”104 Yet, Zauderer had been required to disclose 
certain matters in his advertising that he would not 
otherwise have mentioned,105 so the fact that North 
Carolina was mandating speech did not alone make such a 
requirement constitutionally offensive. Further, just as the 
 
 98. Id. at 785–86. 
 99. Id. at 789. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 795. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
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requirement placed on Zauderer was designed to clear up 
possible misconceptions about the terms under which his 
services were available, the requirement placed on the 
professional fundraiser might clear up misconceptions 
about how much of the donation would actually go to 
charity. 
What was at issue in Riley was professional speech, but 
the Court did not accept that “a professional’s speech is 
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that person’s 
financial motivation for speaking.”106 In any event, even 
commercial speech may not “retain[] its commercial 
character when it is inextricably intertwined with 
otherwise fully protected speech.”107 Here, when discussing 
the “commercial character” of speech, the Court was 
referring to an aspect of the speech that would make it 
subject to less rigorous review.108 
The Riley Court understood that people might want to 
know the degree to which previously raised funds had been 
used for charitable purposes,109 and also understood that 
the State was merely requiring “full disclosure.”110 
However, the North Carolina requirement was not immune 
from invalidation merely because it involved “compelled 
statements of ‘fact.’”111 For example, the Court would not 
“immunize a law requiring a speaker favoring a particular 
government project to state at the outset of every address 
the average cost overruns in similar projects,”112 
notwithstanding that “the foregoing factual information 
 
 106. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795. 
 107. Id. at 796. 
 108. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 800 (noting that “the potential donor [might be] 
unhappy with the disclosed percentage”). 
 110. Id. at 798. 
 111. Id. at 797. 
 112. Id. at 798. 
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might be relevant to the listener.”113 Such “a law 
compelling . . . disclosure would clearly and substantially 
burden the protected speech.”114 
When considering the constitutionality of regulations, 
the Court looks at whether individual rights are 
burdened,115 and also at whether the regulation is 
sufficiently closely tailored to promote a sufficiently 
important state interest.116 But one of the ways to 
determine if a statute is sufficiently closely tailored is to see 
whether the same goals can be accomplished in a way that 
does not impose such a burden on the First Amendment.117 
For example, rather than require all fundraisers to discuss 
the percentage of raised monies that were devoted to 
noncharitable purposes, the State might simply require 
that a potential donor asking about the percentage of raised 
funds going to noncharitable purposes be supplied with the 
requested information.118 Or, another alternative would be 
to have “the State . . . itself publish the detailed financial 
disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to 
file.”119 Or, the State could “vigorously enforce its antifraud 
laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (“The State’s interest in compensating victims 
from the fruits of crime is a compelling one, but the Son of Sam law is not 
narrowly tailored to advance that objective. As a result, the statute is 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”). 
 117. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (“The State 
also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more 
extensive than necessary. It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of 
regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more 
likely to achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance.”). 
 118. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 (“[A] donor is free to inquire how much of the 
contribution will be turned over to the charity. Under another North Carolina 
statute, also unchallenged, fundraisers must disclose this information upon 
request.” (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C–16 (1986)). 
 119. Id. at 800. 
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money on false pretenses or by making false statements.”120 
The State’s having all of these alternatives that imposed 
less of a burden on the First Amendment suggested that 
North Carolina’s chosen means was not sufficiently closely 
tailored to achieve the desired end. 
Riley must be reconciled with Zauderer with respect to 
the kinds of speech the government might compel without 
violating constitutional guarantees—Riley concerned 
compelled disclosure of fully protected speech,121 whereas 
Zauderer concerned compelled disclosure in a commercial 
context where there would have been a real likelihood of 
confusion were the required information not included.122 
However, that is not the only way to distinguish the cases. 
Another way focuses on the target of the regulation—
professional fundraisers versus attorneys—although the 
Court made clear in a subsequent case that it was not 
merely distinguishing among occupations. 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada involved an alleged 
violation of the Nevada Rules regarding attorney 
conduct.123 Hours after his client had been indicted, 
attorney Dominic Gentile made a statement to the press 
alleging that his client was being scapegoated and that the 
State was not going after the real culprits, the police.124 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 796 (“[W]e apply our test for fully protected expression.”). 
 122. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(“[A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”). 
 123. 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) (“The State Bar of Nevada then filed a 
complaint against petitioner, alleging a violation of Nevada Supreme Court 
Rule 177, a rule governing pretrial publicity almost identical to ABA Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6.”). 
 124. Id. at 1034 (“The State Bar of Nevada reprimanded petitioner for his 
assertion, supported by a brief sketch of his client’s defense, that the State 
sought the indictment and conviction of an innocent man as a ‘scapegoat’ and 
had not ‘been honest enough to indict the people who did it; the police 
department, crooked cops.’”). 
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Gentile’s client was subsequently exonerated.125 
The Gentile Court characterized the attorney speech as 
political, noting that “speech critical of the exercise of the 
State’s power lies at the very center of the First 
Amendment.”126 The Court explained that “disciplinary 
rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity 
protected by the First Amendment,”127 and in any event 
that the attorney “spoke at a time and in a manner that 
neither in law nor in fact created any threat of real 
prejudice to his client’s right to a fair trial or to the State’s 
interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws.”128 The 
Court struck down the Nevada rule, at least “[a]s 
interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court.”129 
Whether discussing regulations of professional 
fundraisers or attorneys, the Court’s professional speech 
cases distinguish between (deceptive) advertising on the 
one hand and political (or similarly protected) speech on the 
other. The circuit courts have considered the Court’s cases 
on professional speech, and have come up with a different 
kind of approach to evaluating the constitutionality of 
professional speech regulation. 
At issue in King v. Governor of New Jersey was a New 
Jersey law “prohibit[ting] licensed counselors from 
engaging in ‘sexual orientation change efforts’ with a client 
under the age of 18.”130 Those challenging the law were 
“New Jersey licensed counselors and founders of Christian 
counseling centers that offer counseling on a variety of 
issues, including sexual orientation change, from a religious 
 
 125. Id. at 1033 (“Some six months later, the criminal case was tried to a jury 
and the client was acquitted on all counts.”). 
 126. Id. at 1034. 
 127. Id. at 1054. 
 128. Id. at 1033. 
 129. Id. at 1048. 
 130. 767 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Nat’l Inst. of Family & 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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perspective.”131 
The Legislature justified its prohibition by noting that 
having a same-sex sexual orientation is not an illness,132 
and that attempts to modify orientation are not only 
ineffective but also pose a significant risk of harm.133 
Because the therapy at issue only involved “‘talk therapy’ 
that is administered solely through verbal 
communication,”134 the Third Circuit reasoned that the 
communication was “speech that enjoys some degree of 
protection under the First Amendment.”135 However, 
because the plaintiffs were “speaking as state-licensed 
professionals within the confines of a professional 
relationship, . . . [the] level of protection [wa]s 
diminished.”136 Given this lower standard, the statute 
passe[d] muster “if it directly advance[d] the State’s 
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from harmful 
or ineffective professional practices and [wa]s not more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”137 The 
court upheld the regulation.138 
The Ninth Circuit examined a California law banning 
“state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in 
‘sexual orientation change efforts’ (‘SOCE’) with patients 
under 18 years of age.”139 The California Legislature, like 
the New Jersey Legislature, had two justifications: the 
treatment was ineffective and posed a risk of serious 
 
 131. Id. at 220–21. 
 132. Id. at 221 (“The New Jersey legislature found that ‘being lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming.’”) 
 133. Id. at 222 (“Many of these sources emphasized that such efforts are 
ineffective and/or carry a significant risk of harm.”). 
 134. Id. at 221. 
 135. Id. at 224. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 238 (“New Jersey has satisfied this burden.”). 
 139. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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harm.140 Upholding the ban,141 the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the fact that therapy only involved speech posed no bar 
to the legislature’s ban,142 noting that tort liability attaches 
to the negligent provision of medical advice and that the 
First Amendment does not bar the imposition of such 
liability.143 But medical advice is speech, and the fact that a 
professional is merely talking does not immunize such 
speech from sanction. That said, however, states 
presumably have a compelling interest in preventing 
professionals from offering medical advice that might lead 
to harm,144 so the fact that states are not precluded by 
constitutional guarantees from sanctioning doctors who put 
their clients at risk does not establish that such regulations 
only pass muster under lower level scrutiny. 
So, too, while the circuits used a lower level of scrutiny 
when upholding statutes precluding physicians from using 
talk therapy to change a minor’s sexual orientation,145 those 
statutes might well have been upheld even had a higher 
level of scrutiny been employed. States have a compelling 
 
 140. Id. at 1050 (“The legislature relied on the well documented, prevailing 
opinion of the medical and psychological community that SOCE has not been 
shown to be effective and that it creates a potential risk of serious harm to 
those who experience it.”). 
 141. Id. at 1057 (“The record demonstrates that the legislature acted 
rationally when it decided to protect the well-being of minors by prohibiting 
mental health providers from using SOCE on persons under 18.”). 
 142. Id. at 1056 (“We further conclude that the First Amendment does not 
prevent a state from regulating treatment even when that treatment is 
performed through speech alone.”). 
 143. Id. at 1054 (“[D]octors are routinely held liable for giving negligent 
medical advice to their patients, without serious suggestion that the First 
Amendment protects their right to give advice that is not consistent with the 
accepted standard of care.”). See also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (“Longstanding torts for professional 
malpractice, for example, ‘fall within the traditional purview of state regulation 
of professional conduct.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 144. Cf. Fett v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2016) (“[T]he state has a compelling interest in ensuring that the medical care 
provided by Board certified doctors conforms to the standard of care.”). 
 145. See supra notes 136–37, 141–43 and accompanying text. 
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interest in protecting the health of the populace,146 and 
prohibitions on treatments that are not only ineffective but 
also pose a risk of significant harm are closely tailored to 
promoting that state interest.147 Thus, even if the circuits’ 
professional speech standard is viewed as too forgiving,148 
that does not mean that laws precluding ineffective and 
potentially harmful talk-treatments are therefore 
unconstitutional. 
III. BECERRA 
California law required CPCs to post certain 
information. That requirement was successfully challenged 
as a violation of First Amendment guarantees. The holding 
itself may be less surprising than the Becerra Court’s 
supporting rationales, which may have implications for 
CPCs in particular and First Amendment law more 
generally that the Court may be unwilling to endorse. 
A. California Regulation of CPCs 
The California Legislature passed the California 
Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive 
Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act), which required 
licensed CPCs to post a notice explaining that California 
provides free or low-cost services, including abortions,149 
and unlicensed centers to post a notice explaining that they 
 
 146. E.g., Ohio Bd. of Dietetics v. Brown, 614 N.E.2d 855, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993) (“[T]he state has a compelling interest in the health and welfare of its 
citizens.”). 
 147. Cf. Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1375 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (noting 
the claim that the statute prohibiting SOCE therapy was well-suited to 
promoting this compelling state interest), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013), 
and aff’d, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 148. See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 149. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 
(2018) (“Licensed clinics must notify women that California provides free or 
low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.”). 
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were not licensed to provide medical services.150 The 
California Legislature justified the requirement by noting 
that many women were unaware of their options, and that 
those who might consider an abortion were in a time-
sensitive situation in which it might be important for them 
to receive the information in a timely way.151 
The Becerra Court implied that the Legislature passed 
this act because it disapproved of pregnancy center 
opposition to abortion.152 For example, the Court noted that 
the author of the Act had written, “‘unfortunately,’ . . . there 
are nearly 200 licensed and unlicensed crisis pregnancy 
centers in California . . . [who] ‘aim to discourage and 
prevent women from seeking abortions.’”153 The Court 
continued, “To address this perceived problem, the FACT 
Act imposes two notice requirements on facilities that 
provide pregnancy-related services—one for licensed 
facilities and one for unlicensed facilities.”154 If, indeed, it is 
“unfortunate” that CPCs exist in California and if “this 
perceived problem” refers to the centers’ opposition to 
abortion, then it is hardly surprising that the Court held 
the statute unconstitutional—viewpoint discrimination is 
very unlikely to pass constitutional muster.155 
 
 150. Id. (“Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has not 
licensed the clinics to provide medical services.”). 
 151. Id. at 2369 (“The Legislature posited that ‘thousands of women remain 
unaware of the public programs available to provide them with contraception, 
health education and counseling, family planning, prenatal care, abortion, or 
delivery’ . . . [and cited] the ‘time sensitive’ nature of pregnancy-related 
decisions . . . .”). 
 152. See id. at 2370–71 n.2 (“Petitioners raise serious concerns that both the 
licensed and unlicensed notices discriminate based on viewpoint.”); see also id. 
at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This separate writing seeks to underscore 
that the apparent viewpoint discrimination here is a matter of serious 
constitutional concern.”). 
 153. Id. at 2368 (majority opinion). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content 
discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the 
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Yet, the Court’s analysis was not based on the state’s 
having engaged in viewpoint discrimination.156 Instead, the 
Court separately analyzed the regulations regarding 
licensed versus unlicensed facilities, discussing why neither 
requirement was likely to pass constitutional muster.157 
B. Licensed Clinics 
The licensed clinics were required to post a sign 
specifying “California has public programs that provide 
immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family 
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of 
contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible 
women.”158 The notice was to “be posted in the waiting 
room, printed and distributed to all clients, or provided 
digitally at check-in,”159 and it was to “be in English and 
any additional languages identified by state law.”160 
The Becerra Court explained that the “licensed notice is 
a content-based regulation of speech,”161 and that “such 
notices ‘alte[r] the content of [their] speech.’”162 Further, the 
clinics were not even allowed to use their own 
phraseology—”licensed clinics must provide a government-
drafted script about the availability of state-sponsored 
services, as well as contact information for how to obtain 
 
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the 
rationale for the restriction.”). 
 156. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he apparent 
viewpoint discrimination here is a matter of serious constitutional 
concern. . . . The Court, in my view, is correct not to reach this question.”). 
 157. Id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (“In short, petitioners are likely to succeed 
on the merits of their challenge to the licensed notice.”); id. at 2378 (“[T]he 
unlicensed notice is unjustified and unduly burdensome under Zauderer.”). 
 158. Id. at 2369. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 2371. 
 162. Id. (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
795 (1988)). 
340 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
them.”163 To add insult to injury, “[o]ne of those [state-
sponsored] services [wa]s abortion—the very practice that 
petitioners are devoted to opposing.”164 Not only was the 
clinics’ message altered—”[b]y compelling individuals to 
speak a particular message, such notices “alte[r] the 
content of [their] speech”165—but the new message was 
allegedly the exact opposite of what the clinics wished to 
say. 
Yet, the Court’s implicit claim that the clinic’s message 
was changed with respect to “the very practice that 
petitioners are devoted to opposing”166 was not entirely 
accurate. The State was not requiring the clinics to promote 
abortion but merely to mention that the State provides 
abortion services. Such a posting would not undermine the 
clinic’s position that abortion is wrong or that abortions can 
be detrimental but, instead, would merely inform women of 
the factual claim that the State provides such services. 
Nonetheless, even if the requirement merely involved 
the provision of factual information so that patients would 
be more fully informed, that would not immunize the 
requirement from invalidation.167 Riley struck down a 
requirement that professional fundraisers reveal certain 
information, notwithstanding that the information was 
factual and that the State wanted to promote full 
disclosure.168 Just as North Carolina could itself have 
published the information that it wanted the professional 
fundraisers to divulge, California could itself publish that it 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 795). 
 166. Id. 
 167. A separate question is whether the requirement that this information be 
provided in this context passes constitutional muster. See supra notes 95–120 
and accompanying text. 
 168. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798; see also infra notes 169–170 and accompanying 
text. 
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provided low-cost or no-cost abortions for eligible women.169 
But if that is so, then California had another alternative 
that would have imposed less of a burden on First 
Amendment guarantees.170 
When analyzing whether the California statute passed 
muster, the Becerra Court dispensed with the professional 
speech analysis relatively quickly. The Court noted that 
some of the circuit courts had “recognized ‘professional 
speech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to 
different rules.”171 But professional speech is not “a 
separate category of speech”172 and, further, speech is not 
“unprotected merely because it is uttered by 
‘professionals.’”173 While the circuits were not saying that 
anyway,174 the Court was correct that such an approach did 
not capture Supreme Court precedent.175 
The Court’s having set up a straw man to strike 
down176 might seem relatively harmless, because states 
would be unlikely to claim that the speech of professionals 
 
 169. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (noting that California “could inform the 
women itself with a public-information campaign”). 
 170. Id. (“California could inform low-income women about its services 
‘without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech.’”) (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 
800). 
 171. Id. at 2371 (citing King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 
2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–1229 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore-King 
v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568–570 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 172. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 173. Id. at 2371–72. 
 174. See King, 767 F.3d at 226, abrogated by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (“Pickup explained that ‘the First 
Amendment rights of professionals, such as doctors and mental health 
providers’ exist on a ‘continuum.’ On this ‘continuum,’ First Amendment 
protection is greatest ‘where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 175. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that the rejected 
doctrine had not been adopted by the circuits). 
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enjoys no constitutional protection anyway.177 Professionals 
engaging in speech might well not be offering professional 
speech,178 for example, writing an op ed in a local 
newspaper,179 and so might well enjoy certain protections 
that might not apply to the conversations with patients 
about which treatment would be best.180 Nonetheless, the 
Court’s implicit analysis may provide the basis for 
challenging state-mandated language that the Court had 
 
 177. A separate issue involves the degree to which professional speech to and 
with a client is subject to regulation. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial 
Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social 
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court and 
lower courts have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours of a 
professional’s freedom to speak to a client.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to 
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (2007) (discussion “regulat[ion] [of] communication 
between a doctor and a patient that occurs in the course of ongoing medical 
treatment . . . [which] I shall call ‘professional speech.’”). Justice White offered a 
different view on professional speech. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring) (“One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand 
and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the 
client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in 
the practice of a profession.”). However, this would seem to make Gentile’s 
speech subject to more regulation. See supra note 124 and accompanying text 
(discussing how his clients was allegedly being railroaded by the State). When 
Gentile engaged in political speech by suggesting that the true culprits in that 
case—the police—were not being investigated, see supra notes 124–25 and 
accompanying text, he was likely doing so after having taken his client’s 
individual needs into account and after having considered what would benefit 
his client. But the Court rejected Nevada’s claim that that it could subject 
Gentile to sanction for having engaged in this professional practice, although 
the Court might be interpreted to have been denying that Gentile had in fact 
acted in a way that would undermine the State’s interest in the enforcement of 
its laws. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Post, supra note 177, at 948 (distinguishing between “speech by a 
professional and professional speech”). 
 179. See id. (discussing an op-ed about amalgam fillings written by a dentist 
who had agreed to limit what he said about such fillings when talking to his 
patients). 
 180. Id. at 949 (“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot 
be censored and suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion 
within the medical establishment. But when a physician speaks to a patient in 
the course of medical treatment, his opinions are normally regulated on the 
theory that they are inseparable from the practice of medicine.”). 
2019] DECEPTION, SPEECH & CPCs 343 
heretofore implied passed constitutional muster.181 
The Beceera Court noted that it has upheld compelled 
disclosure in some contexts,182 but claimed that the 
“Zauderer standard does not apply,”183 explaining that “the 
licensed notice is not limited to ‘purely factual and 
uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available.’”184 The Court then 
suggested that Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston185 supported the Becerra Court’s 
interpretation of Zauderer. Because the required “notice in 
no way relates to the services that licensed clinics provide 
[but] [i]nstead . . . requires these clinics to disclose 
information about state-sponsored services, . . . Zauderer 
has no application here.”186 
Here, the Becerra Court suggested that the only 
information that could be required was information about 
the terms under which the clinic’s services will be available. 
But Hurley does not support the Court’s limited 
interpretation187 and, further, the Court’s interpretation 
may have important implications in the context of 
regulating what must be said when women seek 
abortions.188 
In Hurley, the Court offered its understanding of 
Zauderer, explaining that “the State may at times . . . 
 
 181. See infra notes 270–72 and accompanying text (discussing state-
mandated abortion language). 
 182. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 
(2018) (“This Court’s precedents have applied a lower level of scrutiny to laws 
that compel disclosures in certain contexts.”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985)). 
 185. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See infra notes 189–95 and accompanying test. 
 188. See infra notes 265–69 and accompanying text. 
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require[e] the dissemination of ‘purely factual and 
uncontroversial information.’”189 Outside the commercial 
context, however,190 the State “may not compel affirmance 
of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.”191 
More must be said about the conditions under which 
affirmance may not be compelled. One interpretation of 
such a limitation is that the State is precluded from forcing 
an individual to affirm beliefs that the individual does not 
hold. But that limitation may be less robust than first 
appears. For example, the CPCs were not being asked to 
affirm anything with which they disagreed—they were 
merely being asked to affirm that the State did something 
(provide abortions) of which they disapproved. 
Hurley had quoted Zauderer to suggest that the State 
may “prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial 
advertising,”192 and also noted the “general rule, that the 
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only 
to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but 
equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather 
avoid.”193 This general rule, if applicable to the CPCs, would 
preclude their being forced to articulate statements of fact 
that they wanted to avoid, for example, that the State of 
California provides no-cost or low-cost abortions. 
To see whether this general rule protects the CPCs, 
Zauderer must be explicated more clearly. If Zauderer is 
distinguishing between commercial advertising and 
everything else such that only commercial advertising is 
less protected, then the State might be precluded from 
 
 189. 515 U.S. at 573 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 190. See id.; see also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 424 
(2001) (explaining that Zauderer “refus[es] to apply Wooley [Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977)] and Barnette [W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943)] in a commercial context”). 
 191. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 192. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 193. Id. (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 
(1995)). 
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forcing the CPCs to make the objectionable statements of 
fact. However, suppose that Zauderer is distinguishing 
between commercial and noncommercial speech. Suppose 
further that the CPCs’ speech about which services they 
and the State provide count as commercial speech. Then the 
general rule about not being forced to articulate statements 
of fact the speaker would prefer to avoid may not be 
applicable to the CPCs. 
The Hurley Court cited to Riley,194 which involved the 
difference between fully protected speech (even though it 
involved solicitation) and less protected, commercial 
speech,195 thereby suggesting that the relevant difference 
was between commercial and noncommercial speech rather 
than on advertising speech in particular versus other kinds 
of speech. But if that is so, then Zauderer, understood in 
light of Hurley196 and Riley,197 is likely distinguishing 
between commercial and noncommercial speech. Where 
commercial services are provided and a substantial number 
of clients are or might be misled, “‘warning[s] or 
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order 
to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or 
deception.’”198 The jurisprudence preceding Becerra does not 
suggest that CPCs cannot be forced to articulate statements 
of fact that they would prefer to avoid. 
Perhaps Becerra is reformulating the jurisprudence to 
suggest that the State’s power to compel speech is more 
limited than previously thought—perhaps lower scrutiny 
will only be applied to regulations of advertising rather 
 
 194. See id. at 573–74 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 
487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988)). 
 195. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Riley). 
 196. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 94–121 and accompanying text. 
 198. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). 
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than to commercial speech more generally.199 Perhaps in 
addition, the State is only permitted to require purely 
factual and uncontroversial information about the services 
actually provided rather than other kinds of information 
that a speaker would prefer not to mention. However, such 
a limitation on what entities can be required to say will 
become more and more restrictive depending upon how few 
services are provided or, perhaps, which claims are 
accepted as noncontroversial.200 
C. Unlicensed Clinics 
California law required unlicensed clinics to post a 
“government-drafted notice stating that ‘[t]his facility is not 
licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and 
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly 
supervises the provision of services.’”201 The notice had to 
be “on site and in all advertising materials,”202 and was to 
be “posted in English and as many other languages as 
California chooses to require.”203 
The Court was suspicious that California was targeting 
certain clinics, noting that “[t]he unlicensed notice applies 
only to facilities that primarily provide ‘pregnancy-related’ 
services,”204 which was “a curiously narrow subset of 
speakers.”205 For example, the Court noted that a “facility 
across the street that advertises and provides 
nonprescription contraceptives is excluded [from the 
 
 199. See supra note 192 (quoting Zauderer about regulating what is orthodox 
in advertising). 
 200. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (noting the Becerra Court’s 
point that abortion is a controversial subject). 
 201. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 
(2018) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 123472(b)(1)). 
 202. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123472(b)(2), (3)). 
 203. Id. at 2378. 
 204. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(b).) 
 205. Id. at 2377. 
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requirement that it advertise that it is unlicensed]—even 
though the latter is no less likely to make women think it is 
licensed.”206 The Court failed to mention that unlike those 
facilities providing contraceptives, many of the CPCs 
engaged in deceptive practices.207 
California had some difficulty in offering a plausible 
justification for its requirement. At oral argument, the 
State denied that “the justification for the FACT Act was 
that women ‘go into [crisis pregnancy centers] and they 
don’t realize what they are.’”208 Presumably, this 
justification was not offered because it would have been 
inaccurate to claim that no women knew which services 
were actually provided at such centers. After all, some of 
the CPCs are quite forthright in describing the services that 
they do or do not provide,209 so there is less reason to think 
that all of the women going into such centers would be 
confused about which services were provided. 
Yet, misunderstandings about which services are 
actually provided at the clinics would likely continue even if 
some clinics accurately advertise which services they 
provide. Women who did not see the accurate advertising 
but nonetheless went to the center whether because of 
misleading signage210 or because of word-of-mouth might 
not be aware of the limited services provided. Further, even 
if some centers are forthright about the services they 
provide, other centers are not. Some of the latter centers 
 
 206. Id. at 2378. 
 207. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 843 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (discussing “the Legislature’s findings regarding . . . CPCs, which 
often present misleading information to women about reproductive medical 
services”), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 
S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 208. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377. 
 209. See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 210. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that some centers have 
misleading signage or purposely locate near clinics providing abortions so that 
individuals might mistakenly go to a crisis pregnancy center while thinking 
that they had gone to a clinic providing abortion services). 
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suggest that they offer abortion services,211 so it would be 
unsurprising for some women who go to such centers to be 
confused about which services are actually provided. 
California’s announced justification was to assure that 
“pregnant women in California know when they are getting 
medical care from licensed professionals.”212 In the Court’s 
view, California had not “demonstrated any justification for 
the unlicensed notice that is more than ‘purely 
hypothetical.’”213 But the Court’s characterization of 
California’s rationale was surprising—a legislative finding 
of deceptive advertising214 provides more than a “purely 
hypothetical” basis for the law. 
Consider Zauderer, where the Court refused to label 
Ohio’s worry about possible consumer confusion as purely 
hypothetical, instead suggesting that individuals might be 
expected to fail to distinguish between fees and costs.215 
Yet, individuals who saw workers dressed in white coats or 
scrubs216 might well be misled into believing that doctors 
were present even if in fact that was not so, and it should 
not be necessary to conduct a survey217 to recognize the 
 
 211. Cf. First Resort, 860 F.3d at 1276–77 (“[T]he clinic’s website included 
‘detailed information about abortion procedures offered at outpatient medical 
clinics’ and ‘implie[d] on its “Abortion Procedures” page that First Resort 
perform[ed] pregnancy tests and ultrasounds as a prelude to offering abortion 
as an outpatient procedure, or referring clients to a provider who performs 
abortions.’ . . . First Resort . . . conceals from the public the fact that First 
Resort neither performed abortions nor referred clients to abortion providers.”). 
 212. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv., § 1(e)). 
 213. Id. at 2377. 
 214. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio’s worry 
that the public might not understand the conditions under which the attorney’s 
services were being provided). 
 216. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1341 
(2014) (“The people who work there, even those who are not medical 
professionals, wear scrubs or white lab coats, just like doctors and nurses.”). 
 217. Cf. supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
Zauderer Court declined to require survey evidence). 
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likelihood that such confusion would occur.218 
Even if some women would not understand which 
services were provided at a particular clinic, a separate 
question involves what steps may be taken by the State to 
ameliorate that problem. The California legislation had 
required all unlicensed pregnancy centers to post a 
“government-drafted statement,”219 even if the pregnancy 
center itself had noted that it did not provide abortions.220 
Requiring clinics to post government-prescribed language 
(especially where the clinic had itself addressed the 
relevant concerns) might seem to be a rather intrusive step, 
although California likely thought that its regulation 
requiring unlicensed clinics to self-identify as unlicensed 
would pass muster after Riley.221 
In Riley, the Court noted that “nothing in this opinion 
should be taken to suggest that the State may not require a 
fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his or her professional 
status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored 
requirement would withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.”222 Riley at least suggests that requiring an 
 
 218. See Dep’t of Civil Rights ex rel. Cornell v. Edward W. Sparrow Hosp. 
Ass’n, 377 N.W.2d 755, 764 (Mich. 1985) (“Sparrow Hospital imposed two 
different dress codes on its laboratory technologists, a male dress code and a 
female dress code. The codes were intentionally designed to reinforce sexual 
stereotypes: men were dressed to look like doctors, and women were dressed to 
look like nurses.”); id. at 757 (“Male technologists, on the other hand, were 
permitted to wear a white laboratory coat over ordinary street clothing. The 
laboratory director testified that the dress code was justified because patients 
were used to seeing males dressed like doctors and females dressed like 
nurses.”). See also Rory R. Olsen, Who Woke the Sleeping Firefighter?, 2 EST. 
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 275, 285 (2010) (noting that “[t]he SS (Nazi 
paramilitary corps) staff in charge of the transports donned white coats to keep 
up the charade of a medical procedure”). 
 219. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 
(2018). 
 220. See id. at 2377 (“It requires covered facilities to post California’s precise 
notice, no matter what the facilities say on site or in their advertisements.”). 
 221. For a discussion of Riley, see supra notes 81–104 and accompanying text. 
 222. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 799 n.11 
(1988). 
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unlicensed clinic to disclose its unlicensed status passes 
constitutional muster. Indeed, the Second Circuit upheld a 
requirement that “pregnancy services centers to disclose 
whether or not they ‘have a licensed medical provider on 
staff who provides or directly supervises the provision of all 
of the services at such pregnancy services center,’”223 citing 
Riley in support.224 
Yet, Riley and Becerra can be reconciled with respect to 
the constitutionality of government-required disclosures of 
professional status. When the Riley Court suggested that 
such a requirement would pass muster, the Court was not 
considering a requirement that included government-
mandated language; instead, the requirement was merely 
that the language be unambiguous.225 In contrast, the 
Becerra Court was considering “a government-drafted 
statement”226 that might “drown[] out the facility’s own 
message.”227 The California requirement would have been 
more likely to pass muster if the State had permitted the 
clinics to craft their own unambiguous messages. That said, 
however, California could permissibly drown out a message 
that was misleading or likely harmful to women’s health,228 
although the Becerra Court did not seem to believe that at 
issue.229 
Notably absent in the Becerra majority or concurring 
opinion was any mention of the deceptive practices of some 
clinics, although the dissent explicitly notes that the 
 
 223. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 246 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted). 
 224. See id. at 246–47. 
 225. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11. 
 226. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) 
(“The States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination 
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.”). 
 229. See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text. 
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Zauderer Court “ask[ed] whether the disclosure 
requirements were “reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”230 The 
majority’s failure to mention the deception was significant 
if only because such an omission might lead those reading 
the opinion to misunderstand what various states have 
been trying to do with regard to the clinics, namely, clear 
up some misconceptions that might have arisen because of 
misleading advertising or because of confusing signage or 
because of the confusing way that some employees might be 
dressed.231 
Suppose that California had only been interested in 
clearing up some of the misconceptions that might arise 
from confusing advertising. In that event, the State might 
have required that misleading advertising include 
clarifying language so that women considering going to the 
clinic would know which services would actually be 
provided by the clinic. Such an approach was upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit, an opinion that the Court refused to 
review.232 However, such an approach would not have 
reached those women whose misunderstanding about which 
clinic services were provided was not due to false 
advertising, and California was likely trying to address 
both deceptive advertising and on-site practices that did not 
communicate to those seeking services which services would 
or could be provided.233 
The Becerra Court suggested that the California 
requirement imposed on unlicensed clinics was “unjustified 
and unduly burdensome under Zauderer.”234 Because that 
 
 230. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 651). See also id. at 2390. 
 231. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 232. See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018). 
 233. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting that the requirement 
applied to advertising and to what must be included on-site). 
 234. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
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requirement was imposed “no matter what the facilities say 
on site or in their advertisements,”235 the requirement could 
not stand. Regrettably, the Court made matters more 
rather than less murky when suggesting that California 
had “impose[d] an unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirement that will chill . . . protected speech,”236 because 
the example offered by the Court was of “a billboard for an 
unlicensed facility that says ‘Choose Life.’”237 If indeed the 
statue would have required that such a billboard disclose 
the requisite information,238 then the California law failed 
to distinguish between advertising of a service and 
expression of a political view about abortion. But if that was 
the reason that the statute failed to pass muster, then one 
would expect that the difficulty could have been resolved by 
including clarifying language that the statute was not 
meant to reach political speech.239 
Zauderer also involved a claim that the advertising 
regulation was reaching political speech, but the Court 
rejected that challenge by noting that what might be 
political in another context was nonetheless still 
commercial in the context before the Court. “Appellant’s 
advertising contains statements regarding the legal rights 
of persons injured by the Dalkon Shield that, in another 
context, would be fully protected speech. That this is so 
does not alter the status of the advertisements as 
 
 235. Id. at 2377. 
 236. Id. at 2378. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. (“As California conceded at oral argument, a billboard for an 
unlicensed facility that says ‘Choose Life’ would have to surround that two-word 
statement with a 29-word statement from the government, in as many as 13 
different languages.”). 
 239. Cf. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]he City did not attempt to ban advertisements related to constitutionally 
protected pro-life advocacy; . . . ‘[t]he City respects the rights of [LSPCs] to 
counsel against abortions . . . and the City does not intend . . . to regulate, limit 
or curtail such advocacy.’” (citation omitted)). 
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commercial speech.”240 The Zauderer Court noted that 
“Ohio has placed no general restrictions on appellant’s right 
to publish facts or express opinions regarding Dalkon 
Shield litigation; Ohio’s Disciplinary Rules prevent him 
only from conveying those facts and opinions in the form of 
advertisements of his services as an attorney.”241 So, too, 
one might have expected the Becerra Court to explain that 
California was placing no restriction on the right to express 
opinions on the merits of childbirth over abortion as long as 
this was not in the form of advertisements of clinic services. 
The Becerra Court cautioned that it was “express[ing] 
no view on the legality of a similar disclosure requirement 
that is . . . less burdensome.”242 For example, state 
regulations of clinics that engaged in deceptive advertising 
would be more limited, especially if the State required that 
the deceptive advertising be corrected without at the same 
time mandating that government-prescribed language be 
used.243 So, too, regulation of on-site deceptive practices 
might be upheld, especially given a showing of consumer 
confusion. Thus, Becerra may be viewed as a limited ruling 
in that a less robust statute might be upheld if it did not 
require government-mandated language or, perhaps, did 
not target those clinics who were quite forthright about 
which services were or were not provided. However, Becerra 
might also be read more broadly and might have 
implications in other contexts. 
IV. APPLICATIONS IN OTHER CASES 
The Becerra Court seemed outraged that the State 
 
 240. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7 (1985). 
 241. Id. at 637 n.7. 
 242. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 243. See First Resort, 860 F.3d at 1273. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (“The State may deal effectively with false, 
deceptive, or misleading sales techniques.” (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976))). 
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would require that CPCs communicate the government’s 
favored message to those seeking clinic services. Yet, states 
require that pregnant women receive various kinds of 
information when deciding whether to carry their 
pregnancies to term. Further, the State may require posting 
a variety of notices that employers do not wish to post, and 
Becerra provides a basis for challenging the 
constitutionality of several of these state requirements. 
A. Abortion 
The Becerra Court implied that California opposed the 
clinics’ anti-abortion views.244 But the Becerra limitations 
on government-prescribed speech and on requiring 
dissemination of controversial matters might have 
implications for other abortion regulations. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, the plurality noted that “[a]s with any medical 
procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the 
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.”245 
However, the plurality cautioned that “[u]nnecessary health 
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose 
an undue burden on the right.”246 
The Casey analysis focused on whether requiring a 
pregnant woman to hear certain information violated her 
right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,247 
noting that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make 
the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all 
 
 244. See supra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
 245. 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993) 
(“[T]the right to abortion has been described in our opinions as one element of a 
more general right of privacy, . . . or of Fourteenth Amendment liberty.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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others in doing so.”248 As far as her 14th Amendment rights 
were concerned, “a state measure designed to persuade her 
to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if 
reasonably related to that goal.”249 That information was to 
include “the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn 
child.’”250 In addition, the “physician or a qualified 
nonphysician must inform the woman of the availability of 
printed materials published by the State describing the 
fetus and providing information about medical assistance 
for childbirth, information about child support from the 
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and 
other services as alternatives to abortion.”251 Unless the 
woman was willing to certify in writing that she had “been 
informed of the availability of these printed materials and 
ha[d] been provided them if she cho[se] to view them,”252 
the abortion could not be performed.253 
The Casey plurality discussed the “substantial 
government interest justifying a requirement that a woman 
be apprised of the health risks of abortion and 
childbirth.”254 Refusing to construe informed consent 
narrowly,255 the plurality saw “no reason why the State 
may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an 
abortion of the availability of materials relating to the 
consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences 
have no direct relation to her health.”256 Abortion was not 
being treated differently from other medical procedures—“a 
 
 248. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 249. Id. at 878. 
 250. Id. at 881 (citation omitted). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 882. 
 255. Id. at 883 (“[I]nformed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms 
that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.”). 
 256. Id. at 882. 
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requirement that a doctor give a woman certain 
information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion 
is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a 
requirement that a doctor give certain specific information 
about any medical procedure.”257 
Yet, analogizing abortion to other kinds of medical 
procedures may have important implications. Suppose, for 
example, that a pregnant woman is at risk of having severe 
complications if she carries her pregnancy to term.258 A 
doctor who failed to apprise her of her condition and of the 
alternatives open to her might well be subject to liability.259 
Nor would a physician be immune from liability merely 
because he himself does not provide the service at issue.260 
But a broadly construed informed consent requirement 
might have important implications for CPCs. 
The Becerra Court seemed incensed that a clinic could 
be required to post something about abortion because the 
imposition of such a requirement would alter what the 
clinic would say and would support a position opposed by 
the clinic. Yet, the Becerra Court seemed unaware that the 
 
 257. Id. at 884. 
 258. Even were the pregnancy not high-risk, there might be a question 
whether a woman should be informed about the morbidity/mortality rates of 
early abortion versus carrying a child to term. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Wis., 
Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 968 (W.D. Wis.) (“[T]the risk of death 
associated with childbirth in the United States is approximately 14 times 
higher than that associated with abortion, and women are more likely to 
experience complications from live births than from having abortions.”), aff’d 
sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
 259. Cf. King v. Jordan, 696 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (App. Div. 1999) (“To establish 
her lack of informed consent cause of action, plaintiff was required to adduce 
evidence showing that (1) defendant failed to disclose alternatives “which would 
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proximate cause of her injury.” (citation omitted)). 
 260. See Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1984) (“Like 
physicians, a chiropractor may be liable for failing to refer a patient to a 
medical practitioner.”), modified, Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994). 
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Casey plurality had given short shrift to “an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information 
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner 
mandated by the State. While acknowledging that 
physicians had a right not to speak,261 the plurality 
reasoned that the right not to speak was implicated “only as 
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.”262 Given that 
standard, the plurality saw “no constitutional infirmity in 
the requirement that the physician provide the information 
mandated by the State here.”263 
It is unclear what to say about Casey’s guidance in the 
Becerra context. Some of the clinics at issue were 
unlicensed, which suggests that they were not engaging in 
the practice of medicine and so might not be thought 
subject to limitations on the practice of medicine. Yet, Casey 
suggests that the “physician or qualified nonphysician must 
inform the woman”264 on a variety of matters, which means 
that even those not practicing medicine were subject to the 
applicable requirements. Further, some of the women going 
to CPCs may have been led to believe that the clinics 
provided medical care,265 which put those women at risk if 
they were not receiving such care. Not only might such 
women be wasting their precious time,266 but they might be 
induced not to seek needed medical care elsewhere, 
 
 261. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment 
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 264. Id. at 881. 
 265. Cf. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1275 (9th Cir. 2017) 
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certain medical services.”). 
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precisely because they mistakenly believed that they had 
already received such care.267 
After Becerra, the Casey deference to state regulations 
on abortion may no longer represent the law. For example, 
the Becerra Court implied that the State could only require 
dissemination of factual noncontroversial information.268 
But much information regarding abortion is controversial. 
Indeed, when describing “abortion [as] anything but an 
‘uncontroversial’ topic,”269 the Court seemed to imply that 
the State was exceeding its power by requiring the 
dissemination of any particular information on this 
inherently contested topic. 
Consider a state law requiring physicians to inform 
patients seeking abortions that an “abortion will terminate 
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”270 
Such a statement is hardly uncontroversial,271 and state-
required dissemination of information making abortion less 
attractive may not be able to pass muster after Becerra.272 
 
 267. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839–40 
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Becerra may have important implications for abortion 
jurisprudence generally because state-required 
dissemination of both pro-choice and pro-life abortion 
positions seems much less likely to survive constitutional 
scrutiny. 
B. First Amendment 
The Becerra Court may be modifying First Amendment 
jurisprudence in a few areas, although that will depend 
upon whether the implied positions are later ignored or, 
instead, developed. It is simply unclear whether the Court 
is signaling a new era in the regulation of commercial and 
professional speech. It is also unclear whether the State 
will now be precluded from requiring the posting of 
mandated speech on a variety of topics. 
1. Commercial and professional speech 
The Becerra Court denied both that “‘professional 
speech’ [i]s a separate category of speech”273 and that 
speech is “unprotected merely because it is uttered by 
‘professionals.’”274 But the Court left open the conditions 
under which regulations of professional speech will trigger 
less demanding scrutiny. 
Consider the examples provided by the Court where 
state regulations would be given greater deference, for 
example, the Court has “applied a lower level of scrutiny to 
laws that compel disclosures in certain contexts,”275 such as 
 
Supreme Court has never held that a state has the power to compel a health 
care provider to speak, in his or her own voice, the State’s ideological message 
in favor of carrying a pregnancy to term, and this Court declines to do so today. 
To the extent the Act is an effort by the State to require health care providers to 
deliver information in support of the State’s philosophic and social position 
discouraging abortion and encouraging childbirth, it is content-based, and it is 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.”), aff’d sub nom. 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 273. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 274. Id. at 2371–72. 
 275. Id. at 2372. 
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a “disclosure requirement govern[ing] only ‘commercial 
advertising’ and requir[ing] the disclosure of ‘purely factual 
and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available.’”276 This exception is 
relatively narrow, especially if “uncontroversial 
information” is defined narrowly.277 For example, the Court 
noted that abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ 
topic.”278 But if that helped explain why California’s 
regulation did not pass constitutional muster, then state 
regulations requiring the posting of information on a whole 
host of controversial matters involving health, wealth, 
happiness, and daily living might be unconstitutional. 
Indeed, if only “purely factual” information can readily be 
regulated and there is much debate about which assertions 
involve “false facts,”279 there may be even further narrowing 
of the category of statements whose regulation is subject to 
more deferential review. 
The Court mentioned an additional exception, namely, 
“regulations of professional conduct that incidentally 
burden speech,”280 for example, “[l]ongstanding torts for 
professional malpractice.”281 But this exception might also 
be relatively narrow. For example, the Becerra Court 
nowhere considers whether the unlicensed clinics would be 
liable in tort for their failure to tell a patient that she was 
at risk of severe health complications if she did not get an 
abortion, and the Court might well reject that such liability 
could be imposed because the information supplied by a 
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clinic “is not tied to a procedure at all.”282 
The Court’s presumed view might seem attractive at 
first. Someone who went to a clinic knowing that the clinic 
did not provide medical services would neither expect to be 
provided such services nor have much cause for complaint 
when such services were not provided. But some of the 
women attending these clinics were likely induced to have 
the mistaken belief that they were getting medical advice, 
and the State was trying to avoid some of the difficulties 
that would arise from a woman’s thinking that she had 
gotten medical advice when she had not. If the State can 
neither require posting corrective information nor impose 
liability for the foreseeable harms that might result from 
some of these misunderstandings, then the State is being 
handcuffed in its attempts to promote public health and 
safety. 
The Court suggested that outside of the two exceptions 
it discussed—(1) compelling disclosure in the commercial 
context of purely factual and uncontroversial information 
and (2) incidental burdens on speech in the malpractice 
context—the Court has “long protected the First 
Amendment rights of professionals.”283 But this suggests 
that unless these possibly narrow exceptions have been 
met, state regulations of professionals may have to pass 
muster under strict scrutiny to be upheld. 
Becerra implies that the Court may be unwilling to 
distinguish between commercial and political contexts. The 
Court suggested that the clinics had a particular (anti-
abortion) viewpoint that they were trying to promote and 
that requiring that the clinics to post that the State 
provides low- or no-cost abortions would undermine the 
clinics’ desired message.284 But the posting requirement 
was not being imposed in a political setting, but in a setting 
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where services were provided and where there was reason 
to fear that some of the clients were misinformed about the 
actual services provided.285 To analyze the constitutionality 
of the requirement in terms of whether it could be imposed 
in a political setting is to radically misconstrue the purpose 
behind the posting requirement and may make imperil 
state attempts to require postings on other matters.286 
2. Posting requirements 
The State requires employers to post certain 
information to assure that employees are informed, for 
example, about safety requirements287 or minimum wage or 
overtime requirements.288 But such postings might be 
considered controversial in that the employer believes the 
requirements unnecessary and burdensome and in any 
event certainly alters the message that the employer would 
otherwise deliver. Further, to the extent that Becerra is 
protecting the right of clinics not to articulate factual 
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statements that they would prefer to avoid, a number of 
entities would seem protected from being forced to 
articulate disapproved messages. 
Arguably, requiring such postings do not offend First 
Amendment guarantees because the signs involve 
government speech rather than employers being forced to 
articulate views that they neither hold nor wish to 
communicate.289 But the Becerra Court did not uphold the 
California requirement because, after all, it was the 
government speaking about the services that it provides. 
On the contrary, the Court struck down the requirement 
because the posting includes information about a service of 
which the clinics disapproved. 
Part of the reason that the Riley Court struck down 
regulations about what professional fundraisers had to say 
was the State had other means to communicate the desired 
message.290 But the same argument could be made in a 
variety of contexts—the Becerra Court may be suggesting 
that there can be no requirement that government speech 
be posted in a private setting because the government has 
alternative ways to inform the public of the relevant 
information, for example, by undertaking massive and 
expensive public education campaigns, that do not impose 
the same First Amendment burdens. Such an approach 
would have important implications for the constitutionality 
of a variety of posting requirements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Becerra Court struck down a California 
requirement that CPCs post certain information on-site and 
 
 289. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 58 (D.D.C. 2012) (“But 
the Board’s notice posting requirement does not compel employers to say 
anything. The poster that the regulation prescribes for the workplace is 
‘government speech,’ which is ‘not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech 
Clause.’”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 290. See supra notes 109–120 and accompanying text. 
364 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
in their advertising. It may be that the requirement was 
overbroad because forcing clinics to use government-
mandated language even if those clinics provided the 
relevant information in their own words and even if the 
clientele was already aware of what services were and were 
not provided by the clinics. If the correction of those 
shortcomings would suffice to save the California statute 
from invalidation, then the Becerra opinion may not be 
particularly momentous. 
Yet, Becerra may not be cabined so readily. It offers 
analyses of the conditions under which state regulations of 
commercial and professional speech will be upheld which 
may severely constrain state regulation of such speech and, 
in addition, may make it more difficult to distinguish 
between commercial and noncommercial speech. Becerra 
may provide constitutional protection for a variety of 
commercial entities who refuse to provide factual 
information that those entities would simply prefer to 
avoid. 
Becerra may well provide the basis for challenging a 
number of state-imposed requirements regarding the 
dissemination of information about a number of matters 
including health and safety information, worker rights, and 
controversial views about fetal status and development. 
While it is unclear what Becerra will be taken to mean in 
the future, it is clear that the Court has, “unwittingly or 
otherwise,”291 provided the basis for modifying both 
abortion jurisprudence and several areas of First 
Amendment law. 
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